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This article analyzes the impacts of Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) when the 
government is constrained not to increase the public debt-to-output ratio. We consider 
an overlapping generations model with pollution. Public spending for pollution abate-
ment are financed by tax revenues and public debt. We show that keeping constant the 
public debt-output ratio is not an obstacle to attain a double dividend, i.e. an increase 
of both (i) environmental quality and (ii) aggregate consumption. First, if the capital 
stock is low and the pollution abatement is large enough, a successful ETR consists in 
a rise of the environmental tax, compensated by a decrease of the income tax. Secondly, 
we show that the environmental tax revenues may help reduce the public debt-output 
ratio. We give conditions (on the initial level of the environmental tax and the debt-
output ratio) such that an increase of the environmental tax, budget-balanced by a 
decrease of the debt-output ratio may also achieve a double dividend. We conclude 
that public debt crisis should not compromise ETR, instead, environmental tax reve-
nues could be part of the solution.*
I. Introduction
The growing environmental concerns motivate the European countries to adapt their 
tax structure by introducing new taxes on pollutants. These tax revenues are used to 
limit the distortions by reducing other taxes, otherwise they are allocated to pollution 
abatement sectors. The allocation decision is guided by fiscal objectives which impose 
to control public deficits and public debt. Indeed, high levels of public debt can be a 
barrier for launching environmental programs if they exacerbate government deficits. 
This was likely to be the case in Europe during the global debt crisis that started in 
2007.
1
In this article, we study the impacts of Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) under a debt 
constraint, when public actions to protect the environment are financed by public funds. 
Could a public debt stabilization objective be an obstacle to the success of ETR? Conversely, 
could the environmental tax revenues reduce the public debt and protect the environment?
We consider an overlapping generations (OLG) model with pollution externalities. 
Production deteriorates the environmental quality, harming the welfare of future genera-
tions. Public spending for pollution abatement is financed by taxation and public debt, but 
the government is constrained not to increase the public debt-to-output ratio.
We show that the level of capital stock and the pollution abatement are the key factors 
that explain the consequences of the ETR. Namely, if the capital stock is low and the public 
pollution abatement is large enough, an increase of the environmental tax, compensated 
by a decrease of the income tax, may yield a double dividend, defined as an increase of 
both (i) the environmental quality and (ii) the aggregate households’ consumption. We also 
find that an increase of the environmental tax budget-balanced by a decrease of the debt-
output ratio may attain a double dividend. The intuitions of the main mechanisms at work 
are the following. The direct impact of an increase of the environmental tax rate is a rise 
in the tax revenues. To maintain the budget balanced, the government can compensate 
this increase by a decrease of the labor tax rate or a decrease of the debt-output ratio. This 
evolution of the tax system increases net incomes and savings, which rises the capital stock 
and wages, leading to a rise of aggregate consumption. In addition, a higher capital stock 
induces a drop of the interest rate, which reduces the debt reimbursement burden in the 
future. Finally, maintaining a sufficiently high level of public spending ensures pollution 
mitigation. Accordingly, public debt constraint should not compromise ETR, instead, envi-
ronmental tax revenues could be part of the solution.
Our findings confirm the empirical results of rausch, s. [2013]. Using an OLG dynamic 
general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy, Raush shows that when a carbon tax is 
employed to consolidate public debt, the environmental policies could generate sustained 
welfare gains for future generations. However, we differ from rausch, s. [2013] by first 
considering a simple theoretical model (one aggregate sector) which allows for complete 
analytical solving and clear explanations of the transmission channels. Raush considers a 
multi-sectoral production structure including intermediate production, with specific details 
on the energy sector. Secondly, we take into account pollutant emissions and pollution miti-
gation to shed light on the intergenerational environmental externalities, whereas Raush’s 
article focuses on energy consumptions, prices and incomes, and do not consider any pollu-
tion externalities.
Whether an ETR can be designed without negatively affecting the economic welfare 
has given rise to a huge literature. As governments use the revenues from pollution taxes 
to decrease other distortionary taxes, environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend1 
1. More generally, the double dividend is defined as (i) an improvement of the environmental quality and
(ii) a decrease of the distortions induced by the tax system. Actually, depending on the context, there exist
many interpretations of the second dividend, like the increase of GDP, employment, private consumption...
In our article, we will assume aggregate consumption as a good proxy of this dividend.
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(goulder, l.h. [1995]). In addition, environmental decisions have an impact on the welfare 
of both current and future generations. These intergenerational issues on environmental 
externalities and taxation have been already studied. For instance, BovenBerg, a.l., and 
B.J. heiJdra [1998] examine the effects of a green tax on polluting capital when the tax 
revenue is redistributed by lump-sum intergenerational transfers. This literature generally 
concludes that a double dividend can be obtained at the expense of equity (Proost, s., and 
d. van regemorter [1995], BovenBerg, a.l., and F. van der Ploeg [1996], Bosello, F., 
et al. [2001], chiroleu-assouline, m., and m. Fodha [2005], chiroleu-assouline, m., and
m. Fodha [2006] and chiroleu-assouline, m., and m. Fodha [2014]).
Furthermore, debt financing has been introduced in dynamic models with environ-
mental concerns (BovenBerg, a.l., and B.J. heiJdra [1998]; heiJdra, B.J., et al. [2006], 
Fernández, e., et al. [2010]). Debt policy only makes possible to redistribute welfare 
gains from future to existing generations: there is no debt financing of the pollution miti-
gation sectors. Fodha, m., and t. seegmuller [2012] analyze the consequences of ETR 
under a public debt stabilization constraint with public abatement industry.2 But, the 
households also invest in private pollution abatement.
In this paper, we rather analyze the interactions between the public debt consolida-
tion objective and environmental policies when pollution abatement is a public sector, 
financed by tax revenues and debt emission. We examine whether a revenue-neutral 
increase in the pollution tax compensated by a change of the tax system can yield a 
double dividend, and benefits all generations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. section II presents the OLG model 
with environmental externalities. section III defines the intertemporal equilibrium 
and examines the properties of the steady states. section IV studies the impacts of 
an increase of the environmental tax balanced through a decrease of the income tax. 
section V presents the consequences of an ETR balanced by a decrease of the debt-
output ratio. The final section provides the conclusions.
II. The Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with discrete time ( t = 0,1,...,  +∞ ), 
capital accumulation, and environmental quality which degrades with production, but 
may be improved by public abatement, financed by tax revenues or public debt.
II.1. Household
At each period, a new generation is born. There is no population growth and population 
size of a generation is normalized to N > 0.  Individuals live for two periods: young and 
old. The young born in period t have preferences over their consumption bundle when 
2. In a similar framework, Fodha, m., and t. seegmuller [2014] consider the impacts of pollution on life
expectancy.
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young ( )ct  and old ( ),dt+1  and environmental quality when young ( )Et  and old ( ).Et+1
Et  is an externality for the household. The life-cycle utility is given by: 
ln ( ) (ln ( )),c v E d v Et t t t+ + ++ +γ β γ1 1
where b Î ( )0,1  is the discount factor, g > 0  the relative weight of the environmental 
quality and v( ).  measures the welfare gains from the environmental quality. The young 
born in period t inelastically supplies one unit of labor and receives real wage ( ).wt  An 
income tax ( )tt
w  is imposed on the real wage and the after-tax income is shared between
present consumption and savings ( ).st
When old, the household is retired and entirely consumes the remunerated savings 
( )r st t+1  where rt+1  is the real interest rate.
3 Budget constraints of an individual born in
period t are given by: 
c s w d r st t t
w
t t t t+ = − =+ +(1 ) , 1 1t .
Then, the savings function is derived as: 
s wt t
w
t= +
−
β
β
τ
1
(1 ) . (1)
Because labor is inelastically supplied, the income tax does not distort labor market. 
Nevertheless, the income tax distorting labor supply has been repeatedly examined in 
static general equilibrium models since BovenBerg, a.l., and r.a. de mooiJ [1994] and 
Parry, i.W.h. [1995]. In our model, the income tax affects savings and thereby capital 
accumulation. We focus on the dynamic effects of taxation, through savings, rather than 
static distortions that affect the labor market.
Our ETR consists in an increase of the pollution tax compensated by a decrease of 
the income tax rate or by a decrease of the debt-output ratio. Conditions for a successful 
double dividend achievement rely on the final impacts of the ETR on the tax distortions 
(which may increase because of environmental taxation) relatively to the impacts on 
the pollution externality (which has to decrease). Taking account of distortionary taxes 
on labor by assuming endogenous labor supply for instance would probably facilitate 
the conditions that have to be reached to obtain the double dividend. Indeed, the ETR 
would imply a higher decrease of the labor taxation due to the increase of labor supply, 
in order to balance the government budget, therefore reducing the total distortions of the 
tax structure.
3. We assume complete depreciation of capital. Since the period length is quite long in overlapping gener-
ations model with two-period lived households, this assumption is not restrictive.
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II.2. Firms
A representative firm produces the unique good using a Cobb-Douglas technology: 
Y K Lt t t=
−a a1 ,
where Yt ,  Lt ,  and Kt  are output, labor, and capital stock, respectively. The intensive 
production function is given by y kt t=
a ,  where kt  and yt  are per worker capital stock
and output. Production process emits pollution as by-products and, therefore, govern-
ment imposes an environmental tax ( )t e  on its product sales. Taking the output price 
as numeraire, profits write (1 )- - -t e t t t t tY w L r K .  The first order conditions for profit
maximization are: 
w kt
e
t= − −(1 )(1 )τ α
α (2)
r kt
e
t= −
−(1 ) 1τ α α . (3)
II.3. Government
The government imposes taxes on income and sales. In addition public debt ( )Bt  allow 
to finance a share of pollution abatement ( ).Gt  The government budget constraint is: 
B r B w N Y Gt t t t
w
t
e
t t= − + +−1 ( )t t ,
with B-1 0>  given.
To avoid explosive debt path, we assume that the government spending-output 
G Yt t/  and debt-output B Yt t/  ratios are constant over time, i.e. equal to g > 0  
and d > 0,  respectively (see also de la croix, d., and P. michel [2002]). The budget 
constraint writes: 
δ δ τ τY r Y w N Y gYt t t t
w
t
e
t t= − + +−1 ( ) .
In line with the double dividend literature, we do not analyze the optimal tax system. 
Seeking for optimality would require to take into account the intergenerational externality 
on capital accumulation (dynamic efficiency) and the environmental externality. Given a 
level of abatement per output, we combine two policy instruments in order to (partially) 
decrease the distortions. Our ETRs consist in an increase of t e  compensated by either (i) 
a decrease of t w  or (ii) a decrease of the debt-output ratio d  to obtain a double dividend.
II.4. Environmental Quality
Pollution occurs through production processes while the government spends on emis-
sion abatement. The law of motion of the environmental quality index is: 
E E G Y Et t t t+ = − + −1 0(1 ) , ,η θ ε with given
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where e > 0,  q > 0,  and h Î (0,1)  are efficiency parameters measuring the pollution 
emission from production, the public emission abatement, and the capacity to converge 
to the natural environmental quality in the absence of any pollution flow.
To keep things simple, as we deal with a one sector aggregate output, we assume that 
production is the unique source of pollution (even if it is only a proxy). We also assume q  
and e  to be constant, meaning that we do not consider any green innovation for instance. 
Actually, emissions of many pollutants per unit of output have declined over time in 
developed countries with increasingly stringent environmental regulations and technical 
innovations. But, in the same time, the mix of pollutants has shifted from some pollutants 
to carbon dioxide, biodiversity loss and other solid waste, so that aggregate pollution is still 
high. Our environmental index is supposed to reflect the pollutants diversity.
III. Equilibrium, Steady States and Dynamics
The labor market equilibrium writes N Lt= ,  for all t. Therefore, environmental quality 
per young agent e E Nt t≡ /  satisfies: 
e e g kt t t+ = − + −1 (1 ) ( )η θ ε
α , (4)
and the government budget constraint rewrites: 
δ δ τ τy r y w y gyt t t t
w
t
e
t t= − + +−1 ( ) .
In this section, we consider that g, d  and t e  are kept constant over time and the 
government adjusts the income tax rate t t
w  to balance its budget. Therefore, this tax
rate is endogenously determined by: 
τ δ τ δt
w
t t
e
t tr y g y w= − + − /−[ ( ) ]1 . (5)
By substituting t t
w  in the capital market equilibrium, we obtain a tractable reduced
form of the intertemporal equilibria, where g, d  and t e  are policy parameters.
The market-clearing condition for capital market is:4 
k s yt t t+ = −1 d . (6)
We substitute (1) and the equilibrium prices (2) and (3) to determine an intertemporal 
equilibrium. Following de la croix, d., and P. michel [2002], we define the investment 
factor z k kt t t+ +≡ /1 1
a ,  equal to the ratio of investment5 over output.
4. The capital stock in period t + 1  is equal to the young individuals’ savings in period t minus the public
debt in t. Since the labor market also clears, the equilibrium in the goods market, y c d k gyt t t t t= + + ++1 ,
is satisfied by the Walras’ law.
5. Investment It  respects the standard accumulation equation: K K It t t+ = − +1 (1 )µ ,  where µ  is the
constant depreciation rate. As there is complete depreciation of capital (µ = 1),  we have K It t+ =1 .
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Making this variable substitution reduces the size of the dynamic system that 
governs the dynamics to a one-dimensional equation. Indeed, (6) can be rewritten as: 
z z
g
zt t
e e
t
+ = =
− − − −
+
−
+
−
1 ( )
1 (1 ) ]
1 1
1
φ
β τ α δ
β
αβδ
β
τ[
. (7)
By direct inspection of this equation, we see that zt > 0  for all t requires 
β τ α δ[1 (1 ) ]− − − >g e .  This condition implies that the public debt-output ratio
should not be too large, in order limit the crowding-out effect. Otherwise, if d  moves
beyond the threshold, public debt could absorb the whole flow of private savings, leading
to a fall in capital stock.
We are now able to define an intertemporal equilibrium:
Definition 1.  If β τ α δ[1 (1 ) ]− − − >g e ,  an intertemporal equilibrium is charac-
terized as a sequence of strictly positive investment factors ( ) 1zt t=
∞ ,  satisfying (7), given 
z0 0> .
Dynamics are driven by a one-dimensional dynamic system, where zt  is a prede-
termined variable. Note that z k k0 0 1= / −
a  given implies two initial conditions k0  and
k-1.  In fact, the second initial condition comes from the initial one on debt B-1 0>
and the constant debt-output ratio B Yt t/ = d.  Given the sequence ( )zt ,  we are able
to determine the sequence of per worker capital stock ( )kt  defined by k z kt t t+ +=1 1
a .
Finally, given ( )kt ,  one deduces the dynamics of ( )et  using (4).
The steady-state investment factors are solutions to: 
P z z
g
z
e e
( )
1 (1 ) ]
1
(1 )
1
02= −
− − − −
+
+
−
+
=
β τ α δ
β
αβδ τ
β
[
. (8)
The corresponding stationary level of capital ( )k  and environmental quality ( )e  per 
capita are given by: 
k z= −
1
1 a (9)
e
g
z=
− −θ ε
η
α
α1 . (10)
Steady states and dynamics are characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.  Assuming g < −1 a,  there exists d > 0  such that, when d dÎ [ ,0, )
there are two steady states, an unstable one z  and a stable one z,  given by: 
z
g ge e e
=
− − − − − − − − − − + −
+
β τ α δ β τ α δ β τ αβδ[1 (1 ) ] { [1 (1 ) ] } 4(1 )(1 )
2(1
2
β )
 (11)
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z
g ge e e
=
− − − − + − − − − − + −
+
β τ α δ β τ α δ β τ αβδ[1 (1 ) ] { [1 (1 ) ] } 4(1 )(1 )
2(1
2
β )
º ζ τ δ( , , )e g . (12)
When d d= ,  a saddle-node bifurcation occurs and no steady state exists when 
d d> .
Proof.  The existence of two steady states requires that the discriminant of P z( )  must 
be positive, i.e. 
[ (1 (1 ) ) ] 4 (1 )(1 ) > 0 2 12 2β τ α δ αβδ β τ δ β− − − − − + − ⇔ − −g ge e [
− − + + − + − − − >(1 ) 2 (1 )(1 )] [ (1 (1 ) )] 02τ α α β τ δ β τ αe e eg .
By direct inspection of equation (8), we note that the existence of steady states 
requires δ β τ α< − − −(1 (1 ) )g e .  This may be fulfilled for g < −1 a.  We deduce 
that there exist two steady states if and only if d d< ,  with: 
δ β τ α α β τ= − − − + + −[1 (1 ) 2 (1 )(1 )]g e e
− + − − − − + + −2 (1 )(1 )[1 (1 ) (1 )(1 )]β α β τ τ α α β τe e eg .  (13)
The two steady states are given by (11) and (12). When d d= ,  the two steady states 
merge, and disappear for d d> .
z
t+1
0 z z
z
t
z
t+1
= z
t
z
t+1
= f(z
t
)
Figure 1. – Dynamics with Two Steady States
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We deduce the stability properties from the features of f( )zt ,  given by equation (7). 
Since 
zt
t
zt
t
e
z z
g
→ →+∞
= −∞
− − − −
+
>
0
( ) , ( ) =
1 (1 ) ]
1
0,lim lim
[
φ φ
β τ α δ
β
f f( ) > 0, ( ) 0z zt t′ ′′ < ,
the lower steady state is unstable, whereas the larger one is stable (see Figure 1). 
Note that condition g < −1 a  is standard and not too restrictive. With our specifi-
cations, it reflects the fact that the labor income is not entirely devoted to finance public 
abatement, whatever is the level of the environmental tax rate.
The configuration where there are two steady states ( )d d<  is represented in 
Figure 1. The lower steady state z  is unstable, while the higher one z  is stable. There-
fore, for zt  lower than z,  the economy is relegated to a low-income “poverty trap”, 
where zt  decreases to 0. Otherwise, the economy converges to the steady state z.  Note 
that since k z kt t t+ +=1 1
a ,  the convergence of the investment factor to a stationary value
corresponds to the convergence of the capital stock kt  to its steady state level.
In the next sections, we analyze the effect of fiscal policies on a long-run steady 
state. Because zt  is a predetermined variable, we focus on the stable steady state z.
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We are interested in the possible improvement of both environmental quality and macro-
economic variables of the model. Besides an increase in the amount of environmental 
quality per capita, we are concerned with an increase in the total amount of consumption 
per capita C c d≡ + ,  called “macroeconomic effect”. Instead of measuring the indi-
vidual welfare (aggregate measure), we consider separately the environmental variations 
(usually called first dividend) and the economic side (second dividend). As we mainly 
focus on capital accumulation and distortions from the preexisting taxes, capital stock 
or total consumption are both good indicators of the economic outcome.
Using (10), we deduce the link between environmental quality and the investment 
factor or the capital stock. It depends on the sign of θ εg - ,  which measures the evolu-
tion of the net flow of anthropogenic pollution. When θ εg -  is positive for example, 
pollution abatement is higher than pollutants emission flow.
To evaluate the link between the total amount of consumption per capita and the 
capital stock, we need to investigate whether there is or not capital under-accumulation.
Using the resource constraint y c d k gy= + + + ,  C  is given by: 
C g k k= − −(1 )
a
. (14)
6. To clarify notations, x  will denote in the following the value of the variable xt  evaluated at the steady
state z.
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Given the government policy, C  is maximized for k kg= ,  with: 
k gg = − −[ (1 )]
1
1a a . (15)
From (9), the stationary investment factor corresponding to kg  is z gg = −a(1 ).  
Because ∂ / ∂ <ζ τ δ δ( , , ) 0e g  for all d d<  (see equation (12)), there exists at most 
a unique debt-output ratio d d= g  that corresponds to the maximized level of total 
consumption per capita7: 
ζ τ δ α( , , ) (1 ).e g gg z g= = − (16)
We deduce that there is under-accumulation if and only if d d> g .
Proposition 2.  Assuming d dÎ [ ,0, )  g < −1 a  and β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − ,  there is
under-accumulation of capital at the steady state z  if d d dÎ ( , )g .
Proof.  The steady state z  is characterized by under-accumulation if d d> g ,  
but d d<  is required for its existence. Hence, we need to have d dg < ,  which is 
equivalent to ζ τ δ ζ τ δ( , , ) ( , , )e g
eg g> .  Using (12) and (16), this inequality rewrites
δ β τ α β α> − − − − + −[ .1 (1 ) ] 2(1 ) (1 )g ge  Substituting (13), it is equivalent to
P e(1 ) 0− >t ,  with:
P ge e e(1 ) (1 ) (1 )[2 (1 ) ](1 )2 2− ≡ − + − + − −τ αβ τ β α β β τ
+ + −α β(1 )(1 )2g .
The discriminant of this polynomial of degree 2 is given by 
β β α α β3 2(1 ) [ 4 (1 )(1 )]− − − +g .  When
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − ,  it is negative,
which shows that P e(1 ) 0− >t  for all t e .  This ensures that d dg < .  Therefore, for
d d dÎ ( , )g ,  the steady state z  is characterized by under-accumulation. 
Proposition 2 shows that a not too low level of the debt-output ratio ensures under-ac-
cumulation of capital. To address the plausibility of this result, it is relevant to observe 
that the savings rate b b/ +(1 )  is smaller than 1 2/ ,  while under standard parametri-
zation, the capital share in income a  belongs to (1 4,1 2)/ / .  In this case, the inequality 
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< −  is fulfilled. Finally, note that τ
αβ
β α βe
g
< 1
1
[ (1 )]−
−
− +  
7. From (9), we also have z kg g=
−1 .a
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means that ζ τ δ ζ τ( , , ) ( , ,0)e g
eg g>  which is equivalent to dg < 0 :  the relevant 
interval for under-accumulation becomes (0, )d .
Using these preliminary results that have established the link between, on the one 
hand, environmental quality and capital and, on the other hand, the total amount of 
consumption per capita and capital, we investigate now some environmental policies 
that have positive environmental and macroeconomic effects, i.e. improve both e  and 
C. Given an appropriate level of public abatement per output g, an environmental
policy is characterized by an increase of the environmental tax rate t e .  The govern-
ment budget constraint, evaluated at the steady state z,  writes:
τ
α
α
δ τ δ
τ α
w
e
ez
g
=
−
+
− −
− −1 (1 )(1 )
. (17)
This condition will be fulfilled if either the tax rate on labor income t w  or the debt-
output ratio d  varies following an increase of t e .  We investigate these two policies in 
the next two sections.
IV. ETR Balanced by Labor Income Taxation
We are interested in the effect of an increase of environmental taxation, given that public 
spending-output and debt-output ratios are constant. Therefore, labor income tax will 
adjust to balance the public budget, modifying the level of the investment factor. We will 
focus on a possible improvement of both environmental and macroeconomic variables, 
i.e. environmental quality and aggregate consumption.
Proposition 3.  Assume that d  and g  do not vary, g < −1 a  and 
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − .  Following a rise of the environmental tax rate t e , the investment
factor z  increases, while the labor income tax rate t w  decreases. This ETR produces 
positive environmental and macroeconomic effects if and only if:
(i) The public emission abatement over output is large enough, i.e. g > /ε θ  ; 8
(ii) There is under-accumulation, i.e. d d dÎ ( , )g .
Proof.  We start by studying the effect of an increase of t e  on the steady state invest-
ment factor z.  Differentiating (12), we obtain: 
dz
d
z
g
e
d dg
e eτ
αβ δ
β τ α δ αβδ τ βδ= =
=
+
− − − − − − +
>
0
2
( )
{ [1 (1 ) ] } 4 (1 )(1 )
0.  (18)
8. Recall that this condition implies a negative net flow of anthropogenic pollution.
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The steady state income tax rate is derived as a function of other policy instruments 
from the government budget constraint (17). Indeed, substituting z ge= ζ τ δ( , , ),  it can 
be defined as τ τ τ δw e gº ( , , ).  We obtain: 
d
d
g
z
w
e
dg d
e e
e
e
τ
τ α τ
δ
τ
α τ δ ζ
τδ= =
= −
− −
− +
−
+
− ∂ ⋅
∂



0
2
1
(1 )(1 )
1
1
(1 ) ( )




< 0.  (19)
Now, we can derive the conditions to get the environmental and macroeconomic 
effects. Differentiating (10), we obtain: 
de
d
g
z
dk
de d dg
e
d dgτ
α θ ε
η τδ δ= = = =
=
−
0 0
( )
. (20)
From (9) and (18), the positive environmental effect is obtained if and only if the 
public emission abatement over output is large enough, that is, g > /ε θ.
Differentiating now (14), and using (9) and (15), we have: 
dC
d
z z
z
dz
de d dg
g
e
d dgτ α τδ
α
α
δ= =
−
= =
=
−
−






0
1
0
( )
1
1 . (21)
From (18), the positive macroeconomic effect is obtained if and only if z zg< ,  i.e. 
if d d dÎ ( , )g .  
The environmental tax, in principle, imposes additional costs on polluting behavior, 
which could a priori be harmful for the steady state investment factor. Indeed, such a 
tax increases the costs faced by the firm on its inputs use. However, recycling revenues 
provided from the increase of the environmental tax rate leads to lower income tax rates. 
Because the latter effect is greater than the former on savings, this ETR will increase 
the steady state investment factor. Considering the government budget, note that the 
decrease of t w  comes from two direct effects and a general equilibrium effect. The first 
direct effect is explained by the increase of government revenue coming from a larger 
environmental tax rate. The second direct effect goes through the fact that a higher envi-
ronmental tax rate decreases the interest rate. Indeed, the environmental tax is a tax on 
output, which has a direct negative effect on the return of capital (see (3)). Finally, the 
general equilibrium effect goes in the same direction: a higher level of capital induces 
a decrease in the interest rate. This leads to a smaller amount of debt reimbursement in 
the future and, thereby, it lowers the income tax rate.
The ETR cuts the personal income tax, allowing a larger level of capital per capita. 
This raises aggregate consumption when there is under-accumulation, explaining the 
macroeconomic effect. Note that the requirement of under-accumulation of capital seems 
to be quite realistic, since this is equivalently ensured by a not too low real interest 
rate, which is experienced by most developed countries in the last decades. Recall that 
12
under-accumulation also means dynamic efficiency, which is a feature supported by the 
findings of aBel, a., et al. [1989]. Public emission abatements play an important role 
for the environmental effect. The public spending-output ratio g or efficiency of public 
emission abatements q  has to be large enough to ensure negative pollution flows. In 
this case, environmental quality is positive at the steady state and positively varies with 
the level of capital.
Because the ETR positively affects the steady-state investment factor z,  the condi-
tions for the double dividend differ from those in the literature. For instance, ono, t. 
[2005] considers an ETR that cuts the social security tax in the absence of public 
emission abatement. Therefore, the environmental dividend is produced only when the 
capital per capita decreases. Moreover, the non-environmental dividend is obtained 
because there is over-accumulation at the steady state and capital per worker decreases.
Remarks on the Distributive Issues.  Our analysis has also direct implications 
on the distributive issues. Assuming that the steady state z  satisfies the conditions for 
a successful ETR (i.e. Proposition 3 verified), could this tax policy be detrimental for 
some generations and/or for consumption at some periods? Can we determine which 
generations will benefit from the ETR?
At the first period (i.e. when the tax policy is implemented), the increase of invest-
ment implies a decrease of aggregate consumption, because capital and therefore 
production, are predetermined. In contrast, we have shown that the fiscal policy is bene-
ficial for investment at the steady state towards which the economy converges. Because 
there is under-accumulation of capital and by continuity, the increase of the sequence 
of capital is first damaging for aggregate consumption and, after some date, improves 
consumption.9
Intergenerational environmental externalities and taxation issues have already been 
studied (John, a., and r. Pecchenino [1994], John, a., et al. [1995], hoWarth, r. [1996], 
Fisher, e. o’n., and c. van marreWiJk [1998]). The main result is that environmental 
taxation implies such a welfare loss for the generations experiencing the ETR that its 
implementation can not be wished. The generation which would design the policy would 
also bear the heaviest burden. This result originates in the fact that balanced ETRs have 
generally not been considered. This negative result for the political feasibility is here 
generalized to a balanced-budget reform.
We now briefly discuss the distributive effects of the policy between consumptions 
when young and old at the stable steady state. Could the ETR not only improve aggre-
gate consumption but also both c  and d?  Proposition 3 establishes that the ETR leads 
to a double dividend. In addition, if both c  and d  rise, the ETR verifies the intragenera-
tional equity principle. We show that these three goals could be reached simultaneously. 
Under some mild adding conditions,10 environmental quality, consumptions when young 
9. This assessement is formally proved in Appendix A.
10. See Appendix B for technical details.
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and old become larger. Note that this requires a sufficiently low debt-output ratio. Other-
wise, the increase of the environmental tax rate that decreases the return of assets, 
directly and through the increase of capital, implies a too large decrease of the remu-
nerated debt. In this case, remunerated savings, i.e. consumption when old, decreases.
V. ETR Balanced by Debt-Output Ratio
In this section, we consider an alternative policy. Given an appropriate level of abate-
ment over output, we still investigate the effect of an increase of the environmental 
tax rate. However, to balance the government budget, the debt-output ratio will vary, 
keeping now the labor income tax rate as fixed. We will investigate whether such a policy 
may induce both the positive environmental and macroeconomic effects at the stable 
steady state.
To be more specific, we consider that following an increase of t e ,  the government 
budget is balanced by a modification of d,  taking the labor income tax rate as constant. 
Differentiating (17) with d dgwt = = 0  taking into account that z  is given by (12), the 
policy change is described as: 
d
d
g
ge d w dg
e e
e
δ
τ
τ τ δ τ
τ τ δ δτ = =
= −
∂ / ∂
∂ / ∂0
( , , )
( , , )
. (22)
Using (10) and (14), we note that debt-output ratio affects aggregate consumption 
and environmental quality only through the investment rate z. This allows to prove the 
following proposition:
Proposition 4.  Assume that t w  and g  do not vary, g < −1 a  and 
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − .  Following a rise of the environmental tax rate t e ,  if
τ β αe g> − − /1 (1 ) ,  there is d d Î (0, ),  such that z  is increasing for all d d< 
through a decrease of d.  This ETR produces positive environmental and macroeconomic
effects if and only if:
(i) The public emission abatement over output is large enough, i.e. g > /ε θ  ;
(ii) There is under-accumulation, i.e. d d dÎ ( , )g  .
Proof.  We start by investigating the effect of the increase of t e  on z.  We note that: 
dz
d
g g d
de d w dg
e
e
e
e
d w dgτ
ζ τ δ
τ
ζ τ δ
δ
δ
ττ τ= = = =
=
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
0 0
( , , ) ( , , )
,
where ∂ / ∂ >ζ τ δ τ( , , ) 0e eg  is given by (18) and 
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∂
∂
= −
+ −
− − − − − − +
ζ τ δ
δ
αβ τ
β τ α δ αβδ τ β
( , , ) (1 )
{ [1 (1 ) ] } 4 (1 )(12
e e
e e
g z
g )
0< . (23)
Therefore, a sufficient condition to have dz d e/ >t 0  is d d eδ τ/ < 0.  Using 
(19) and (22), we deduce that d d eδ τ/  and ∂ / ∂τ τ δ δ( , , )e g  have the same sign. The
derivative of (17) with respect to the debt-output ratio taking into account that z  is given
by (12) gives:
∂
∂
=
−
−
∂
∂






−
−
τ τ δ
δ
α
α
δ ζ τ δ
δ τ
( , , )
1
1
1
( , , ) 1
(1 )(1
e e
e
g
z z
g
− α)
. (24)
Using (23) and (24), ∂ / ∂ <τ τ δ δ( , , ) 0e g  is equivalent to ψ δ( ) 1< ,  with: 
ψ δ
α τ
δ
α τ β
β α τ δ αβδ τ
( )
(1 )
1
1 (1 )
[ [1 (1 )] ] 4 (1 )2
≡
−
+
+ − /
− − − − − −
e e
e ez
z
g (1 )+









β
.
We can easily show that ′ >ψ δ( ) 0.  Moreover, using (12), we have: 
ψ δ( ) = +∞
ψ
α β τ
β α τ
(0)
(1 )(1 )
[1 (1 )]
=
+ −
− − −
e
eg
.
Therefore, if y(0) 1< ,  there exists d d Î (0, )  such that ψ δ( ) 1<  for all d d< .
Hence, there is an increase of z  through a decrease of d.
Then, applying the arguments of the proof of Proposition 3, we deduce that, using 
equation (20), the positive environmental effect is obtained if and only if g > /ε θ  
and, using equation (21), the macroeconomic effect is obtained if and only if d d dÎ ( , )g 
because d d < . 11 
We obtain here a similar result than in Proposition 3, considering a different fiscal 
policy, i.e. a larger environmental tax rate implies a lower debt-output ratio, holding the 
labor income tax rate constant. The positive environmental and macroeconomic effects 
occur because this ETR raises z (or k).
When a larger t e  implies a lower debt-output ratio d,  capital accumulation is 
accelerated, because even if the increase of the environmental tax rate has a negative 
effect on savings through its effect on the wage, the lower debt-output ratio reduces the 
11. Note that the interval ( , )d dg   may of course be non empty. For instance, the conditions required in
Proposition 2 are in accordance with dg < 0  for 1 (1 ) 1
1
[ (1 )]− − / < −
−
− +g
geβ α τ
αβ
β α β< .
This requires α β β β> − / +(1 ) (1 ),  which is satisfied for b  sufficiently close to 1.
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usual crowding-out effect associated to debt. This last channel means that a larger share 
of savings is devoted to productive investment. Proposition 4 shows that the second 
effect may dominate.
This fiscal policy is especially interesting because it associates the improvement of 
aggregate consumption and environmental quality to a decrease of the debt-output ratio. 
Regarding the debt sustainability constraints faced by many countries today, this ETR 
gives rise to a third dividend.
VI. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of ETR in an overlapping generations model by taking 
into account a debt stabilization constraint and public pollution abatement. We show 
that, when the budget-neutral reform allows a decrease in the income tax, the steady 
state investment factor increases. This result implies the (first) environmental dividend, 
i.e. an improvement of environmental quality, because of public abatement. On the other
hand, the second (i.e. economic) dividend is obtained when the economy is characterized
by under-accumulation of the capital stock. Finally, an increase of the environmental
taxation budget-balanced by a variation of the debt-output ratio may also increase the
environmental quality and the agents’ consumption. More importantly, this fiscal policy
not only brings about these two benefits but also reduces the debt-output ratio.
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Appendix
A. Intergenerational Distributive Issue
Proposition 5.  Assume that d  and g  do not vary, d d dÎ ( , )g ,  g < −1 a,
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − ,  g > /ε θ  and the initial condition z z0 >  is satisfied. Following
an increase of t e  at date t0 , the positive effects of the ETR fails at t t= 0,  but there exists
a date t t1 0>  such that for all t t> 1,  they occur. 
Proof.  Assume that t e  increases permanently at t t= 0.  By direct inspection of
equation (7) and Figure 1, we deduce that zt  raises for all t t> 0 1+  and converges to 
the stable steady state. Since k z kt t t+ +=1 1
a ,  the same happens for kt  for all t t> 0 1+ .
At t t= 0,  we have c d g k k k g zt t t t t t+ = − − = − −+ +(1 ) (1 )1 1
a a .  Since kt  is
predetermined and zt+1  increases, aggregate consumption falls, which means that the 
positive effects of the ETR fail.
Considering now that t t> 0 1+ ,  d c d g k dk dkt t t t t( ) (1 )
1
1+ = − −
−
+a
a .  For t
sufficiently large, namely t t> ,  the capital stock is characterized by under-accumula-
tion,12 i.e. we have (1 ) 11− >−g kta
a ,  which implies that d c d dk
dk
dkt t t
t
t
( ) (1 )1+ > − + .
Since at a stable equilibrium with z zt =  we have k zkt t+ =1
a ,  there exists t t>   such
that dk dkt t+ / <1 1.
Therefore, when t t t t> =1 { , }max ,   d c dt t( ) 0+ >  because dkt > 0  for all
t t> 0 1+ .  Since e e g kt t t+ = − + −1 (1 ) ( )η θ ε
α  also raises, the positive effects of
the ETR apply for all t t> 1.  
B. Intragenerational Distributive Issue
Proposition 6.  Assume that d  and g  do not vary, 1 { ,− > > /α ε θg max  
1
1
}
2
- -
-
a a
a
,
β
β
α α
1
4 (1 )
+
< − and τ α
α
α
αe g< −
−
− −
1
(1 ).  Following 
an increase of t e ,  there exists d > 0,  such that for all d d d dÎ ( , { , })g min ,  the consump-
tion of young c  is increasing at the stable steady state, and the consumption of old d  is 
increasing in t e  too. 
Proof.  At the stable steady state, consumption when young c  is given by: 
c k g
z
e
e
=
+
− − + + −
−







1
1
1
(1 )
β
α ατ δ
αδ τα
.
12. This is always the case if the sequence of ( )kt  is increasing through time.
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Because ∂ / ∂ >z et 0  (see Proposition 3) and k z= −1/(1 )a ,  we deduce that
∂ / ∂ >c et 0.
Using the fact that savings is equal to k y+ d ,  consumption when old d  is equal to:
d z ze= − +






−
−
−(1 ) 1
2 1
1τ α δ
α
α
α
α .
For d = 0,  we have ∂ / ∂ = / − − −z z ge eτ α τ α[1 (1 ) ].  We deduce that: 
∂
∂
=
− − − −
− − − − −


−d z
g
ge e
e
τ
α
α τ α
α α α ατ
α
α1 2
(1 )[1 (1 ) ]
(1 )(1 ) .
Therefore, for d = 0,  ∂ / ∂ >d et 0  if and only if 1
1
2
− − <
−
g a a
a
,  or 
 equivalently 1 1
1
2
− > > − −
−
a a a
a
g ,  and τ α
α
α
αe g< −
−
− −
1
(1 ).
In this case, by continuity and to be in accordance with Proposition 3, there exists 
d > 0,  such that for all d d d dÎ ( , { , })g min ,
13 we have ∂ ∂ >d e/ 0t . 
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